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Abstract: Revisionist interpretations of British naval policy in the 
Fisher era claim that an elaborate smoke screen was created to hide 
the Royal Navy’s real policies; while documents showing the true goals 
were systematically destroyed. By asserting this, revisionists are able 
to dismiss those parts of the documentary record that contradict their 
theories, while simultaneously excusing the lack of evidence for their 
theories by claiming it has been destroyed. This article shows that this 
methodology is misleading and untenable. 
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In recent times the historiography of the Royal Navy in the decade 
before the First World War has been a lively area of study and debate. 
After many years in which a settled interpretation was established and 
came to predominate – an interpretation centred on competitive 
 2 
dreadnought building and the Anglo-German naval race1 – a series of 
new examinations by revisionist historians appeared that cast an 
entirely different light upon the era and aimed to challenge, if not 
actually overturn, many long-hallowed assumptions.2 Amongst the 
areas the revisionists contested were: first, that the Royal Navy under 
the leadership of First Sea Lord Admiral Sir John Fisher deliberately 
instigated a revolution in naval warship design through the building of 
HMS Dreadnought, a new type of turbine-powered all-big-gun 
battleship that rendered obsolete all previous battleships; second, that 
Fisher sought to build a fleet of these ‘dreadnoughts’ in order to 
protect Great Britain from the menace of the growing German navy; 
third, that the Dreadnought having been developed because the all-
big-gun concept was better suited to long-range gunnery, preparing 
for an engagement at ever greater distances became the Royal Navy’s 
                                   
1 Arthur J. Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power (New York: 
Alfred Knopf 1940); idem., From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. 
Volume 1: The Road to War, 1904-1914 (Oxford: Oxford UP 1961); 
Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: 
Alan Lane 1976). 
2 Jon T. Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology 
and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914 (London: Routledge 1993). 
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principal tactical assumption in the quest for a decisive battle; and 
finally, that the Admiralty’s plan for war against Germany was the slow 
strangulation of the German economy through a strategy of 
interdicting German trade commonly, if inaccurately, known as 
‘blockade’. 
 In place of these arguments revisionists posited that far from 
instigating a Dreadnought revolution, Fisher was actually against the 
construction of battleships, Dreadnought included, and sought instead 
to replace the battleship with the battle cruiser, a multi-role warship 
that could fight foreign battleships if the occasion arose, but which 
would otherwise protect British commerce along distant trade routes. 
To the objection that this would have left Britain without a defence 
against invasion, it was argued that, under Fisher, the protection of 
the British Isles did not rest on battleships at all, but was instead 
devolved to torpedo-armed flotilla craft, smaller vessels such as 
destroyers and submarines which, through a strategy known as ‘flotilla 
defence’, would render the narrow waters around the British Isles 
impassable to large armoured warships. On top of this, it has also 
been suggested that before the outbreak of war in 1914 the Royal 
Navy abandoned the intention of fighting at long ranges, adopting 
instead a medium-range approach that has been termed the 
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‘technical-tactical synthesis’.3 Finally, it has been proposed that far 
from adopting a grand strategy based upon slow economic 
strangulation, the Admiralty’s approach was actually predicated upon 
collapsing the global economy and thereby quickly undermining the 
financial sinews that supported the German war effort. Under this 
scheme a rapid victory was the anticipated result.4 
 The revisionist arguments are notable not just for their 
originality, but also for their total reversal of previously received 
wisdom. They are not mere refinements of existing positions; they 
actually turn earlier assumptions on their heads. In the brave new 
interpretive world they have fashioned almost everything that we 
thought we knew about the British Admiralty turns out to be wrong. 
                                   
3 Jon T. Sumida, ‘The Quest for Reach: The Development of Long-
Range Gunnery in the Royal Navy, 1901-1912’, in Stephen D. Chiabotti 
(ed.), Tooling for War: Military Transformation in the Industrial Age 
(Chicago: Imprint 1996); idem., ‘A Matter of Timing: The Royal Navy 
and the Tactics of Decisive Battle, 1912-1916’, Journal of Military 
History 67 (2003); idem., ‘Expectation, Adaption, and Resignation: 
British Battle Fleet Tactical Planning, August 1914-April 1916’, Naval 
War College Review 60 (2007). 
4 Nicholas A. Lambert, Planning Armageddon: British Economic 
Warfare and the First World War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 2012). 
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 The extent of this world turned upside down begs the question: 
why is it that scholars have not previously noticed the many 
remarkable and innovative dimensions of British naval thinking in this 
period, a series of developments which, in the revisionist perspective, 
amounted to a revolution in naval strategic thought? There are many 
possible answers to this, the most obvious one being that not one of 
these supposed naval revolutions actually took place. Fisher proved 
unable to replace battleships with battle cruisers; the Royal Navy 
never came to rely on mutual sea denial for home defence; no 
battleships were dropped in 1914 in favour of submarines; no British 
admiral adopted medium-range tactics at any major surface action of 
the First World War; and, when war came, a slow rather than a rapid 
economic warfare strategy was implemented. Thus, judged by results, 
each and every one of these ‘revolutions’ proved a phantom. If they 
existed, they are easily missed. 
Of course, this is not the answer given by the revisionists 
themselves, who maintain that the key reason lies in the manner in 
which these innovative naval policies were advanced by their 
proponents and the effect their methods of advancement had on the 
documentary source base later available to historians.5 Aware that the 
                                   
5 Jon T. Sumida, 'Sir John Fisher and the Dreadnought: The Sources of 
Naval Mythology', Journal of Military History 59 (October 1995). 
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ends they sought were so revolutionary that they were bound to meet 
the strongest opposition from diehard traditionalists, who would be 
unable to break away from the comfortable practices of the past and 
accept such radical changes, Fisher and his like-minded colleagues 
allegedly pursued their reforms with more caution than would 
otherwise have been the case, taking great care in the manner in 
which they campaigned for the revolution they sought. One important 
aspect of this approach was that the reformers – Fisher in particular – 
never fully explained what they intended to do. Instead, for each step 
they advanced only such arguments as were necessary for the 
achievement of the specific objective of the moment. As many 
measures could be justified by reference to traditional and hence more 
palatable arguments and did not require a resort to the full 
revolutionary picture, the memoranda they produced to argue for 
specific reforms often revealed neither their real intent nor the full 
longer-term objective. Instead, as with all documents designed more 
to persuade than to explain, they contained misleading arguments 
chosen less with the intention of providing a true account for posterity 
than for their immediate appeal to the particular audience then being 
addressed. In short, the revisionists claim that much of the material 
that Fisher and his associates produced was a form of propaganda 
devised to canvass support for his schemes. It fooled many people in 
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its day and, according to the revisionists, it fooled many historians 
thereafter. Thus, one reason why the orthodox history paints a picture 
that misses out on the ‘naval revolution’ is because the historians 
writing it have been duped into believing that the propagandistic 
messages Fisher put out actually represented his real objectives. 
Given that many of these scholars were (and are) highly 
experienced archival researchers, well versed in documentary analysis 
and accustomed to the concept of ulterior motives, this explanation is, 
on the face of it, surprising. However, another inter-linked factor is 
proffered here to explain why, notwithstanding their many talents, 
these historians were nevertheless misled. According to the revisionist 
analysis, after the failure of Fisher and his supporters to implement 
their most radical reforms, their attempt to do so was deliberately 
covered up in order to remove the visible traces of this apparent set 
back and to dissociate them from policies that might be viewed as 
unsuccessful. This, it is said, led to the wholesale destruction of many 
of the key documents in which the details of the proposed ‘naval 
revolution’ had once been set out. This not only created a major 
lacuna in the archives, obstructing attempts to get to the truth, but it 
further exacerbated the problem of the propagandistic materials, 
because unlike the genuine documentation, which had been weeded 
out, these misleading papers were still freely available. Naturally, in 
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the absence of the original and truthful memoranda, orthodox 
historians, who were oblivious to the existence of the former but were 
able to find numerous examples of the latter, naturally gave weight to 
the documents that had survived, little realising that this survival 
served an ulterior purpose: camouflaging the past. Thus, unwittingly, 
they contributed to the airbrushing out of history of the true story of 
the failed ‘naval revolution’. 
 This account of how generations of historians were misled 
contains elements that are plausible. Anyone who has ever worked in 
the Admiralty papers knows that they are frustratingly incomplete. 
Indeed, the surviving dockets in the National Archives represent a 
mere two per cent of those that were originally registered, a 
staggering 98 per cent having been lost, mislaid, inadvertently 
destroyed or, worse, deliberately weeded as part of the department’s 
notoriously over-zealous archival management process. Given the 
enormous scale of the routine destruction, the absence of particular 
papers cannot automatically be equated with a cover up. Equally, 
however, the idea that some official papers might have been 
surreptitiously purged for being embarrassing does not require too 
great a stretch of the imagination to conceive and, no doubt, there 
were documents that met a premature end for this all-too-human but 
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deeply unsatisfactory reason. Thus, it can be conceded that some gaps 
in the record could have been caused in this way. 
However, acknowledging such a possibility in a general sense is 
quite different from proving that it definitely occurred in relation to a 
specific set of documents. In this context it must clearly be stated that 
just because a particular topic does not appear to be the subject of 
any of the surviving Admiralty papers, this is not in itself evidence that 
any records have been destroyed. After all, there would also be no 
surviving documentation on a given matter if it had never formed the 
subject of discussion in the first place. Consequently, the mere fact of 
being unable to find records on a specific issue does not remove the 
obligation from the historian who asserts that documentation is 
missing, especially if the claim that it is missing incorporates the idea 
of a cover up, of proving that such documentation definitely once 
existed. Fortunately, in the case of the Admiralty, ascertaining what 
was once there is not normally a complex task. Individual Admiralty 
dockets on specific issues frequently make reference to other papers 
relating to the same topic, normally citing the branch serial number or 
Admiralty Record Office title of the papers in question. Armed with this 
information, one can hunt for the cited papers sure in the knowledge 
that they once existed, even if such a search ultimately proves that 
they no longer exist today. Equally, much can be revealed about the 
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former contents of the Admiralty Record Office from a close inspection 
of that body’s run of indexes, digests and compendia. Contained within 
these big leather-bound tomes are details of the names, dates and 
contents, arranged alphabetically and also by subject, of all the files 
that were ever registered with the Admiralty Record Office, including 
those subsequently weeded. It is, thus, possible through the careful 
use of these volumes to ascertain what once existed and what, if now 
missing, has been destroyed. 
The implications of this for any claim about a cover up are 
considerable. It means that to be in any way credible the assertion 
that the documentation for a particular topic has been destroyed, 
deliberately or otherwise, must be proven by reference to hard 
evidence of what was once there in the first place, with actual missing 
files being identified and named in support of this contention. Failure 
to do so must invariably make any statement about destroyed 
documents at best speculative and at worst invalid. Against this 
necessity, in several instances revisionist claims about the ‘naval 
revolution’ being deliberately airbrushed from the records appear 
tenuous or even unsupportable. 
 Of course, it is not only on the destruction of key documents that 
the revisionist position rests; also important is the idea that many of 
the surviving papers are not genuine expressions of Admiralty opinion, 
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but were designed as smokescreens to obscure what Fisher and his 
associates were really trying to achieve. Over the years, this has 
proven an important explanatory devise for revisionists. The 
proposition that much of the surviving documentation might not only 
fail to contain a true record of Admiralty policy, but might actually 
contain a deliberately misleading one has the natural consequence of 
allowing revisionists to dismiss a great deal of the surviving evidence, 
most especially that which runs counter to the thesis that they have 
developed. Now, so long as it can be clearly shown that particular 
documents are indeed propaganda pieces there is, of course, nothing 
wrong with this methodology. And undoubtedly it is on occasion 
possible to point to such subterfuge. No serious naval historian would 
deny that Fisher was a skilled advocate who frequently tailored his 
arguments to the needs of the moment. Equally, it is widely 
recognised that the Admiralty, like any other ministry, was more than 
capable of promoting its particular departmental interests through 
carefully written and self-serving memoranda. However, acceptance of 
these propositions does not imply that all Admiralty documents from 
the Fisher era were smokescreens. Much of its output was a genuine 
reflection of its internal thinking and can safely be used to determine 
this. The necessity, therefore, is having an objective means of 
determining which documents are real expressions of Admiralty 
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opinion and which are propaganda. Unfortunately, there does not 
currently appear to be such a test in the revisionist methodology. 
Rather, the main criterion of judgement appears to be whether or not 
the document conforms or can be made to conform to the ‘naval 
revolution’ argument. Those that do are normally held to be genuine 
expressions of Admiralty thinking; those that do not are frequently 
dismissed as propaganda. Whether such a circular argument that 
blends cause and effect and renders motive and outcome 
indistinguishable is a satisfactory one is certainly open to question, not 
least because it leads to the bizarre scenario where historical 
documents are declared invalid because they do not correspond to 
modern day theories. A striking, but by no means atypical example of 
this back-to-front, overly teleological argumentation is Lambert’s 
contention that the 1907 war plans could not ‘have been [Fisher’s] 
“real plan for war,” since they lacked details relating to … [Lambert’s] 
theory of flotilla defence …’6 
 The purpose of this article is to reassess some of the key 
revisionist arguments in light of the methodological approaches 
adopted to make them. Particular scrutiny will be applied to the claim 
that parts of the documentary record were designed as propaganda for 
the ‘naval revolution’ and hence cannot be used as trustworthy 
                                   
6 Lambert, Planning Armageddon, p.77. 
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evidence for an alternative explanation of Britain’s pre-First World War 
naval policy. Additionally, a spotlight will be shone on the proposition 
that key records were destroyed to cover up radical policies that failed 
to be implemented. Finally, the article will question whether the 
revisionist analysis stands up if the evidential base is not, as it is 
claimed to be, made up of misleading and propagandistic documents in 
need of prolonged and special exegesis to get to the truth, but in fact 
consists of highly important and relatively straightforward documents 
capable of being taken at face value and relatively susceptible of more 
conventional historical analysis. Space does not permit every 
revisionist argument to be assessed, so the specific examples that will 
be scrutinized are ‘flotilla defence’ and ‘the technical-tactical 
synthesis.’ 
 
II. 
The ‘flotilla defence’ thesis was first propounded in detail in an article 
in the Journal of Military History. It was subsequently elaborated in the 
book Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution.7 In these works, Nicholas 
                                   
7 Nicholas Lambert, ‘Admiral Sir John Fisher and the Concept of Flotilla 
Defence, 1904-1909’, The Journal of Military History 59 (1995); 
Nicholas Lambert, [Sir John] F[isher’s] N[aval] R[evolution] (Columbia, 
S.C.: University of South Carolina Press 1999). 
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Lambert argued that British naval policy in the Fisher era had long 
been misunderstood. In a major break with tradition, once Fisher 
became First Sea Lord, the Royal Navy, which had hitherto protected 
the British Isles against foreign invasion by maintaining in home 
waters a powerful fleet of large armoured warships, instead 
substituted a new system based upon the deployment of small flotilla 
craft. These vessels would utilize advances in underwater weapons’ 
technology – especially the torpedo – to make the narrow waters 
around the British Isles impassable to major surface warships. This 
would not only be cheaper than relying on battleships, as flotilla craft 
were less expensive to build, crew and maintain, but had the further 
advantage of freeing the rest of the navy for imperial duties across the 
globe. 
Lambert’s ‘flotilla defence’ hypothesis was forcefully argued and 
gained immediate traction, not least because it seemed to account for 
Fisher’s apparently boundless enthusiasm for destroyers and 
submarines and also to explain how he planned to fulfil the promise 
that originally led to him being appointed First Sea Lord of keeping the 
navy estimates within reasonable bounds. However, there was an 
obvious obstacle. If Fisher was the author of a radical strategy of 
utilising flotilla craft to render the North Sea impassable to an invasion 
force, then why during his period in office was this not reflected in the 
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dispositions of British naval assets in home waters and the plans 
devised for defending the British Isles? Contrary to the expectations 
that ‘flotilla defence’ might create, instead of denuding the North Sea 
of armoured warships and redeploying them overseas, Fisher actually 
created a new Home Fleet, principally comprised of battleships of the 
newest type, and stationed it at the Nore, the only properly defended 
harbour facing the North Sea. Moreover, he then oversaw the 
production of war plans that rested on using these warships to engage 
hostile forces – invariably the German fleet – intent on attacking 
Britain. Thus, in these plans, major surface warships rather than 
torpedo craft formed the backbone of the protective system. If this 
was not already divergent enough from the strategy of ‘flotilla 
defence’, to facilitate the fleet encounter necessary for such a strategy 
to work, Fisher’s plans involved employing the very newest and best 
destroyers to form an observational blockade of the German North Sea 
littoral. Thus, instead of denying the narrow waters of the British Isles 
to enemy shipping, they were being used as pickets to warn of the 
egress of the German fleet and so bring about a climactic battle 
between a British force composed of large armoured warships and a 
German one similarly comprised. 
That Fisher’s supposedly radical new strategy differed so 
markedly from his actual plans and dispositions might have been 
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considered an insurmountable problem by the more fainthearted. For 
Lambert, however, the solution was straightforward. If the plans did 
not conform to the strategic concept that he had uncovered that did 
not mean that the theory of ‘flotilla defence’ needed to be re-thought, 
rather it could only mean that the plans themselves could not be 
genuine. Admittedly, in reaching this conclusion, Lambert was aided by 
a helpful trend in the historiography. The 1907 and 1908 Admiralty 
war plans have long been a matter of puzzlement. Peter Kemp, who 
published an edition of the 1907 war plans, had noted in 1964 that the 
very conventional strategy they espoused seemed strangely out of 
keeping with the technological advances of the Dreadnought age. He 
branded them ‘unrealistic’ and wondered if they had been produced 
with an ulterior motive in mind.8 Others echoed this judgement.9 This 
made it easy for Lambert to follow suit; and he did. The 1907 war 
plans, he explained, ‘were not real war plans’ at all. They were a 
                                   
8 Peter Kemp (ed.) The Papers of Admiral Sir John Fisher Volume II 
(Navy Records Society, 1964),pp.xii and 317. 
9 Paul Haggie, ‘The Royal Navy and War Planning in the Fisher Era’ in 
Paul M. Kennedy (ed.), The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1914 
(London, 1989); Christopher Martin, ‘The 1907 Naval War Plans and 
the Second Hague Peace Conference: A Case of Propaganda’, The 
Journal of Strategic Studies, 27 (2005). 
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‘smokescreen’: hundreds of printed pages that existed purely because 
they ‘rebutted claims by Adm. Lord Charles Beresford … that the 
Admiralty had no ideas on how to fight a war with Germany.’10 While 
this assertion placed him in good company, in a line of reasoning that 
took Lambert further than other historians, he extended this assertion 
of fabrication across several additional years. It was only with the 
production of the 1912 war plans, he argued, that one saw ‘the first 
attempt by the Admiralty to set down on paper the Royal Navy’s real 
plan of campaign in the event of war.’11 In short, not just the 1907 war 
plans, but all the documentation produced before March 1912 that was 
purportedly on war planning was a ruse. That being so, there was no 
reason to consider why a large Home Fleet had been created by Fisher 
and why the observational blockade of the German littoral was the 
assigned role for the best and newest destroyers: none of this was 
seriously intended. 
The argument had an inherent logic and was internally 
consistent, but it hinged on declaring a substantial body of 
documentation – documentation that told a different story –
inadmissible. But was this actually justifiable? And how would it affect 
matters if it were not? 
                                   
10 FNR, p.180. 
11 Ibid., p.262. emphasis added. 
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As has been stated Lambert was not alone in questioning the 
1907 war plans. Despite this, there are grounds for thinking that the 
1907 war plans, let alone all war planning up to early 1912, cannot 
simply be labelled as a ‘smokescreen’ and swept under the carpet.12 
 First, we know that the officer who oversaw their creation took 
the process seriously and regarded the plans as realistic and viable. As 
he explained: 
 
War is not an exact science, and all plans of campaign are 
in consequence necessarily founded upon an estimate of 
reasonable probabilities, endorsed if possible by historical 
experience. … 
The [1907] plans … were largely founded on the known 
opinions of several officers of high standing, embodied the 
results of much special attention, and reached their finished form 
                                   
12 Andrew Lambert also regards the 1907 war plans as ‘a serious 
attempt to think through the nature of a major war in the light of the 
latest experience’. Andrew Lambert, ‘Sir Julian Corbett and the Naval 
War Course’ in Peter Hore (ed.), From Dreadnought to Daring: 100 
Years of Comment, Controversy and Debate in the Naval Review 
(Barnsley: Seaforth 2012), pp.43-4. 
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with the assistance and concurrence of more than one practical 
expert. … 
 
It was for this reason, he further observed, they were given official 
sanction and formally adopted as the Royal Navy’s principal war plan: 
 
In default of an alternative plan representing the views of 
a majority of experts, or of any demonstrable or obvious defect 
or impracticality …, they were officially accepted as applicable to 
the conditions prevailing at the time. They were originally 
drafted in an advisory sense as embodying recommendations 
only, but on acceptance the mandatory form in which they were 
printed and now stand was substituted.13 
 
The officer in question was George Alexander Ballard. This is 
significant because Ballard was one of the most respected strategists 
in the Royal Navy, with unmatched experience in war planning. The 
author of several important studies of naval strategy, including a RUSI 
prize essay, Ballard had been appointed into the Naval Intelligence 
                                   
13 Ballard, ‘Remarks on the Framing of certain Plans for War with 
Germany now at the Admiralty’, 3 May 1909. T[he] N[ational] 
A[rchives of the United Kingdom]: ADM[iralty papers] 1/8997. 
 20 
Department in 1901 and had served there continuously for over four 
years. During that time, he had overseen the production of various 
appraisals concerning war against Germany. Such was his reputation 
for strategic acumen that he was the obvious candidate to head any 
committee seriously engaged in war planning, including the one Fisher 
set up in late 1906 to draft the 1907 war plans. Equally, when the 
government decided to place naval war planning on a professional 
footing by establishing a Naval War Staff in 1912, Ballard was the 
natural choice to head the war planning section, the Operations 
Division. No one else had his experience. 
 Ballard’s high standing gives weight to the idea that the 1907 
plans were not merely a smokescreen, a point reinforced by his claims 
in the above-quoted memorandum, but actually reflected the ideas of 
the officers most intimately associated with developing naval strategy. 
This idea is corroborated by the fact that it is possible to see 
considerable continuity between the designs sketched out in the 1907 
documents and those that Ballard had produced previously when 
serving in the NID.14 They would also be reflected in those that came 
thereafter. The 1909 war plans are particularly important in this 
                                   
14 Shawn T. Grimes, Strategy and War Planning in the British Navy, 
1887-1918 (Woodbridge: Boydell 2012). 
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respect. Until recently, these have been largely ignored.15 One possible 
reason for this is that there are no surviving copies within the 
Admiralty papers at the National Archives, the Admiralty’s own master 
version having been pulped in 1959.16 However, a copy was retained 
by Fisher’s naval assistant, Commander Thomas Crease, and can be 
found among his papers at Portsmouth.17 Unlike the 1907 war plans, 
which, however unjustifiably, are susceptible to the charge of being 
propaganda on account of being set in print and widely distributed, the 
1909 war plans existed only as a typed manuscript and were sent only 
to the commanders-in-chief of the relevant fleets and home ports. 
Thus, all the accoutrements of secrecy and all the details of a relevant 
and restricted readership lacking in the earlier documents are in place 
here, making the charge of naval propaganda untenable and their 
authenticity, in all senses, abundantly clear. So what do they contain? 
                                   
15 This is highlighted in David Morgan-Owen, ‘“History is a Record of 
Exploded Ideas”: Sir John Fisher and Home Defence, 1904-1910’, The 
International History Review 36 (2014), 550-72. 
16 Digest entry for Case 0070. TNA: ADM 12/1466. 
17 War Plan G.U. War Orders for the Commander-in-Chief of the Home 
Fleet, March 1909. N[ational] M[useum of the] R[oyal] N[avy]: Crease 
Papers, MSS 253/84/3. 
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The remarkable aspect of the 1909 war plans is how closely they 
resemble the 1907 and 1908 variants. While not identical in every 
measure, they are predicated on the concept of rotating flotillas of 
modern destroyers to mount an observational blockade of the German 
coasts to provide warning about a sortie of the German fleet. Backing 
up these destroyers, in case German light craft were sent to drive 
them away, was a squadron of cruisers. Supporting these, at a slightly 
greater distance, were the Royal Navy’s armoured cruisers, ready to 
provide heavy cover should a concerted German effort be made to 
disperse the watching forces. Finally behind them were two battle 
fleets. The main one, based in Scotland and consisting of the ‘22 best 
battleships’, would cruise in the northern portion of the North Sea, 
from whence it could both protect the northern part of the British Isles 
and steam south if warning were given that the Germans had put to 
sea. A second fleet, made up of the ’25 next best battleships’, would 
be based between the Channel and the Wash. From here it could cover 
the southern portion of the British Isles and again intercept a German 
fleet if notice were given that one was heading in its direction. 
Alternatively, in line with Michael Clemmesen’s argument that British 
strategy was based upon the concept of a ‘North Sea trap’, the two 
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fleets could coordinate their activities, with one meeting the German 
fleet in battle and the other cutting off any German retreat.18 
The 1909 plans are the antithesis of ‘flotilla defence’. They use 
destroyers for watching and rely upon a concentration of battleships to 
secure victory over the German fleet. Mutual sea denial is nowhere to 
be seen. Moreover, the 1909 war plans are not the exception. A 
straight line can be drawn between them and the 1907 and 1908 war 
plans, with the same concept and similar dispositions being evident 
throughout; and this is not the full extent of the continuity. From what 
we know of the Royal Navy’s operational thinking in 1905, similar 
concepts were articulated then. Likewise, Sir Arthur Wilson as First Sea 
Lord, at the now infamous meeting of the Committee of Imperial 
Defence in August 1911, outlined a comparable scheme.19 In short, 
there is a remarkable degree of continuity in British naval war planning 
from 1905 to 1911, all of which suggests that the surviving 
                                   
18 Michael H. Clemmesen, ‘The War Room Managed North Sea Trap 
1907-1916. The Substance, Roots and Fate of the Secret Fisher-Wilson 
"War Plan".’ 
(http://www.clemmesen.org/articles/Paper_CIHM_2012.pdf).   
19 David Morgan-Owen, ‘Cooked up in the dinner hour? A 
Reconsideration of The Strategic Views of Sir Arthur Wilson’, English 
Historical Review (forthcoming). 
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documentation is genuine and that it is ‘flotilla defence’ and mutual 
sea denial rather than the genuineness of the 1907 and 1908 war 
plans that needs to be called into question. 
 That the idea fore-fronted in the surviving war plans, viz. that 
the German fleet was to be opposed in Home waters by large 
armoured warships rather than flotilla craft, was the heart of the 
Admiralty’s strategic thinking is further sustained by Fisher’s 
distribution of naval assets. It is no coincidence that at the very time 
that elaborate plans were being drawn up predicated upon armoured 
warships, Fisher was creating the very fleet needed to put these plans 
into effect. In late 1906, at approximately the same time as Ballard 
was working on his new plans, the Admiralty decided to reconstitute a 
Home Fleet. While the new fleet would not come into being in its final 
form immediately – its development would proceed in three phases, 
the first of which would occur in early 1907 – its core would ultimately 
consist of the newest and most powerful warships. With its 
headquarters at Sheerness and its best fighting vessels fully manned 
at all times, this core would be stationed facing eastwards into the 
North Sea. As such, it was unambiguously intended for a future 
engagement with Germany. As Fisher explained, it was designed 
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to bring in the newest ships now completing building into the 
Home Fleet, so that in April 1908 the Escadre d’Elite of the Home 
Fleet stationed at the Nore or Dover, with its exercising ground 
in the North Sea, will of itself be sufficient to cope at once with 
the whole German Fleet, while the Portsmouth and Devonport 
Divisions of the Home Fleet will be kept in such a state of 
preparation as to be fully manned and at sea in a few hours.20 
 
As such, the unfolding of this scheme jelled harmoniously with the war 
plans then being written, which required a large body of battleships in 
home waters ready to take up stations in the North Sea at the first 
sign of trouble. The new Home Fleet provided this, thereby 
simultaneously shielding the mainland from invasion and creating the 
force to give battle to the Germans should the destroyers watching the 
German coasts warn of an impending sortie. 
 Taken together, the new Home Fleet and the 1909 War Plans 
suggest that the large body of documentary evidence dismissed by 
Lambert to validate ‘flotilla defence’ cannot be set aside. This is no 
small matter: reversing this methodological error has huge 
implications. When one recognizes that many of the documents 
                                   
20 Admiralty, ‘The Home Fleet’, December 1906. NMRN: Crease Papers, 
MSS 253/59. 
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discredited in the revisionist analysis are in fact genuine and provide a 
valuable insight into Admiralty thinking, then the continuities in British 
naval planning between 1905 and 1911 become striking. Indeed, they 
are especially noticeable for the Fisher years, which was the period 
when the major fleet deployments necessary to bring these plans into 
effect actually took place. The logic of this is that, far from 
downgrading the role of the battle fleet, the Admiralty under Fisher 
actually placed greater emphasis upon it, leading, somewhat ironically 
in the light of Lambert’s arguments, to the criticism from Edmond 
Slade, the Director of Naval intelligence, that Fisher could ‘only think 
of war as an affair of big fleets.’21 Such is the consequence of taking 
the documents seriously. The same point can be made with other 
revisionist theories. 
 
III. 
As is demonstrated elsewhere in this edition,22 one of the most 
problematic of the revisionist arguments is Jon Sumida’s contention 
that prior to 1914 the Admiralty abandoned its attempts to develop 
long-range gunnery and focused instead on a secret plan for fighting 
                                   
21 Slade to Corbett, 2 March 1909. National Maritime Museum: Corbett 
papers, CBT/13/2/37. 
22 See the contributions by John Brooks and Stephen McLaughlin. 
 27 
at medium range. Referred to by Sumida as the ‘technical-tactical 
synthesis’, this posits that if the British and German fleets met in 
battle, British tactics would involve steaming directly towards the 
German forces with a view to unleashing a short but devastating pulse 
of fire at medium range, before turning away in order to avoid 
torpedoes. 
While not always apparent given the confident manner in which 
the argument is presented, by Sumida’s own admission this is a highly 
speculative hypothesis. Thus, while he insists that his case is a ‘very 
strong’ one, he nevertheless also concedes that it is ‘necessarily 
circumstantial’ owing to what he describes as the ‘large gaps in the 
surviving evidence’ and can, as a result, only be adduced ‘by the 
standards of reasonable inference’.23 Whether or not the case is ‘very 
strong’ is, of course, a matter of opinion, one on which judgments on 
this, as on all contested subjects, may differ. The admission that it is 
based upon circumstantial evidence and requires a good deal of 
inference can, however, be readily accepted. After all, no 
contemporary papers of any description have yet been discovered 
setting out, describing or even specifically referring to the concept of 
the ‘technical-tactical synthesis’. In place of such direct documentary 
                                   
23 Jon T. Sumida, ‘Gunnery, Procurement and Strategy in the 
Dreadnought Era’, Journal of Military History 69 (2005), p.1183. 
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evidence, the proof offered for its existence consists largely of 
Admiralty procurement decisions that, we are told, deliberately led to 
the acquisition of ships and equipment that, we are also told, were 
suited for the implementation of this strategy. That being so, the 
deduction made is that the ships and equipment must have been 
ordered with that outcome in mind. Even if one accepts this 
proposition – and there are compelling reasons for doubting it24 – this 
is hardly conclusive. After all, many diverse considerations can affect 
the final specification of a warship. That it should end up after a 
complex design process suited for implementing one particular battle 
strategy could be a matter of deliberate intent, but it could just as 
easily be a coincidental by-product of the ship’s suitability for some 
other function, strategy or purpose. Without something concrete to 
link the two, effect is no proof of cause. 
However, to a large extent such quibbling about the quality and 
implications of the circumstantial evidence is a distraction from more 
fundamental methodological issues related to the broader evidential 
                                   
24 To give one example, Sumida argues that the Admiralty’s purchase 
of the Dreyer table instead of Pollen’s system was because the former 
better suited a medium-range engagement. Brooks conclusively shows 
that the opposite is the case. John Brooks, Dreadnought Gunnery and 
the Battle of Jutland (London: Routledge 2005), pp.69-70, 211-12. 
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base. While Sumida admits that his hypothesis is circumstantial, he 
attempts to justify this by claiming that it is ‘necessarily 
circumstantial’. From whence does this necessity arise? According to 
Sumida the reliance on circumstantial evidence exists because direct 
proof is unavailable. Given that the thrust of his thesis is about the 
preferred range at which the German battle line would be engaged and 
the tactical assumptions surrounding this preference, one might be 
forgiven, in the light of this comment, for assuming that no 
documentation from the leaders of the British battle fleet explaining 
their intentions in such matters has survived. Yet, this is not the case: 
a surprising amount exists on these very points. In particular, we have 
Jellicoe’s War Orders as vice-admiral commanding the second division 
of the Home Fleet issued before May 1912; additionally, we have the 
memorandum ‘Conduct of a Fleet in Action’ issued in March 1914 by 
Callaghan when he was C-in-C Home Fleets; finally, we possess the 
early Grand Fleet Battle Orders (GFBO) issued by Jellicoe on assuming 
command of the Grand Fleet in August 1914. What is remarkable 
about these documents is how logically they fit together and how easy 
it is to draw a straight line between them. Thus, in the first document 
Jellicoe called for fire to be commenced at long range: 
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A slow fire will be opened by guns of 9.2” and above at 15,000 
yards providing the weather conditions and the motion of the 
ship permit. The fire will be quickened as the range and rate are 
found and decrease, and at 13,000 yards to 12,000 yards the 
maximum rate of fire should be established if hits are being 
obtained.25 
 
In March 1914 Callaghan ordered: 
 
For ships of the all big gun type in fine weather, deliberate fire 
may well be opened at about 15,000 yards; 8,000 to 10,000 
yards should suffice for effective range at which superiority of 
fire may be established; ranges below 8,000 yards are to be 
expected towards the later stages of action in order to press 
home advantage and obtain decisive results.26  
                                   
25 Jellicoe, 'War Orders and Dispositions ... Prepared when in 2nd 
Division Home Fleet’, no date [before May 1912], in A. Temple 
Patterson (ed.), The Jellicoe Papers: Selections from the Private and 
Official Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Earl Jellicoe of Scapa. 
Volume I: 1893-1916 (London: Navy Records Society 1966), p.24. 
26 Callaghan, ‘Conduct of a Fleet in Action’, 14 March 1914. Naval 
Historical Branch: Backhouse Papers. 
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Then, in August 1914, Jellicoe mandated: 
 
On a clear day and unless the enemy opens fire earlier, 13.5-
inch gun ships will open deliberate fire at 15,000 yards, 12-inch 
gun ships at 13,000 yards. If the enemy opens fire at greater 
ranges ..., fire is to be opened at once in reply.27 
 
In short, the documentation between early 1912 and late 1914, 
a period notable for being bookmarked by orders from Jellicoe, shows 
a consistent and recurring pattern, namely the call for fire to be 
opened at long range; it mentions no alternative tactics. It is this line 
of continuity that Sumida wishes to break with the ‘technical-tactical 
synthesis’. More remarkable still, given the very clear association of 
Jellicoe with long-range firing in orders coming from both the 
commencement and conclusion of this period, Sumida asserts that it 
was Jellicoe who made this change. As he outlines, as commander of 
the Second Squadron, Jellicoe 
 
                                   
27 Grand Fleet Battle Orders, Addendum No.1, 31 August 1914. 
Patterson, Jellicoe Papers, p.59. 
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must have learned from personal observation of torpedo 
exercises that a battle fleet that steamed on a straight course 
within reach of the new longer-range torpedoes would suffer 
heavy losses. He was thus left with no other means of being able 
to fire with effect … except a medium range fight …. 
 
From this he concludes that ‘Jellicoe probably not only embraced the 
new technical-tactical synthesis, he invented it.’28 This would be fine if 
it could be proven, but no documentary evidence is advanced to 
support this; rather the whole argument is based upon inference. 
Thus, the obvious questions are: What if Jellicoe didn’t learn that 
particular lesson from exercises? And what if he saw other means of 
being able to fire with effect, German torpedoes notwithstanding? The 
obvious answer is that if he didn’t learn this lesson and drew other 
conclusions from his experiences – such as the need to remain out of 
torpedo range – then one would expect his orders from early 1912 and 
late 1914 to be based on the identical tactical assumption, namely that 
it suited the Royal Navy to fight at long ranges. This, of course, is what 
the surviving documents show. 
 If the documentation is so clear and the want of documentary 
evidence for the ‘technical-tactical synthesis’ so striking, how can 
                                   
28 ‘A Matter of Timing’, p.104 (emphasis added). 
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Sumida explain this? The answer, apparently, is a cover up. The fact 
that after 1912 the Royal Navy sought medium range engagements, 
but ended up fighting its First World War battles at long ranges meant 
that the British fleet was inadequately prepared for the conflict that 
actually occurred and performed badly as a result. Naturally, those 
that were responsible for this state of affairs sought to evade blame 
and so withheld information about what they had done. As Sumida 
puts it, ‘the story has not been told before because influential men had 
much to hide.’29 
How were they able to do this? Hiding the truth was apparently 
easy. Gunnery tactics, being a highly confidential topic, very few 
indications concerning the Admiralty’s true intentions had been 
distributed outside of a select circle before the war – even most senior 
admirals and gunnery officers were unaware of them.30 To do so would 
have risked a breach of secrecy whereby the Germans might have 
learnt of the Royal Navy’s true intentions and used this knowledge to 
thwart them. Accordingly, few records were made on this topic and 
those that were made were deliberately destroyed by men such as 
                                   
29 Ibid., pp.87-8. 
30 Ibid., p.106. 
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Jellicoe, who had the motive and means to do so. For them, Sumida 
argues, ‘suppressing the story … was … imperative.’31 
There is a clear logic to this argument, but there is also an 
obvious flaw. While the Admiralty would naturally not have wanted 
secret materials falling into German hands, that did not usually stop 
them from creating documents on sensitive matters – after all, how 
else could they convey their intentions and train the fleet? Nor did it 
prevent the existence of these documents from being recorded in the 
Record Office digests. Numerous surviving and highly confidential 
papers and their digest entries on ship design, weapon’s systems, port 
and harbour facilities, wireless telegraphy, even intelligence 
procedures are a testament to that state of affairs. Yet, in this 
instance, not only is there no such documentation, but there is not 
even any evidence – at least none that has been brought to light – 
which demonstrates that documents concerning a brief medium-range 
engagement followed by a rapid turn away ever existed.32 However, 
we do have documentary evidence of plans for long-range firing. This 
means that it is more likely that the absence of documents on ‘the 
                                   
31 Ibid., pp. 114, 127, 132. 
32 Sumida does show (Ibid., p.114) that we lack a full set of tactical 
instructions and battle orders, but what was in the missing ones is 
unknown. Nothing suggests that they concerned medium-range battle. 
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technical-tactical synthesis’ is not the consequence of a cover up, for 
which there is also no evidence, but a result of their not existing to 
begin with. In short, the documentation we have reflects what was 
intended – long range gunnery. Likewise, the absence of documents 
on a medium-range engagement reflects the fact that it was never 
intended. This would also explain why Jellicoe’s memoirs made no 
mention of such tactics – contra Sumida, he was not covering them 
up, they simply weren’t his intention – and why his Grand Fleet Battle 
Orders took exactly the same line as his 1912 orders – his views had 
not undergone any fundamental change. 
 
IV. 
According to the revisionists the ‘technical-tactical synthesis’ was a 
‘secret’ plan; so, too, was ‘flotilla defence’. Both of these revolutionary 
proposals could not be elaborated to wider audiences, but needed to 
be kept hidden. Neither could be explained after the war. This seems 
plausible until one understands that, to accept this proposition, we 
have to believe in theories for which there is no documentation and to 
disbelieve ones substantiated by large numbers of surviving records. 
The 1907, 1908 and 1909 war plans all stand in the way of ‘flotilla 
defence’, so they are branded as ‘smokescreens’. Likewise, Callaghan’s 
‘Conduct of a fleet in action’ and Jellicoe’s GFBOs are explained away 
 36 
as necessary exceptions from the practices advocated by the 
Admiralty, not true reflections of naval thinking. Such is the 
methodology of these revisionists: one in which conspiracies to hide 
the truth need to be swept away in order to uncover startling 
revelations. However, if we return to a world where important 
documents are kept precisely because they are important and reveal 
rather than hide the intent of their authors, then a different story 
emerges. It has fewer ‘secret plans’ that can be unmasked only by the 
initiated, but its simplicity might just be a mark of its authenticity. 
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